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Summary findings
Cross-national  data  on economic  growth  rates  show that  because  to employers  it signals a positive  characteristic
increases  in educational  capital  resulting  from  like ambition  or  innate  ability.
improvements  in the educational  attainment  of  the labor  *  That  the  marginal  returns  to education  are  falling
force  have had  no positive  impact  on the  growth  rate  of  rapidly  where  demand  for  educated  labor  is stagnant.
output  per  worker.  Expanding  the supply  of educated  labor  where  there  is
In fact,  contends  Pritchett,  the  estimated  impact  of  stagnant  demand  for  it causes  the rate  of return  to
growth  of  human  capital  on conventional  nonregression  education  to fall rapidly,  particularly  where  the  sluggish
growth  accounting  measures  of total  factor  productivity  demand  is due to  limited  adoption  of innovations.
is large,  strongly  significant,  and  negative.  *  That  the  institutional  environments  in many
Needless  to say, this at  least  appears  to contradict  the  countries  have been  sufficiently  perverse  that  the  human
current  conventional  wisdom  in development  circles  capital  accumulated  has been  applied  to activities  that
about  education's  importance  for  growth.  served  to reduce  economic  growth.  In other  words,
After  establishing  that  this  negative  result  about  the  possibly  education  does  raise productivity,  and  there  is
education-growth  linkage  is robust,  credible,  and  demand  for  this more  productive  educated  labor,  but
consistent  with  previous  literature,  Pritchett  explores  demand  for  educated  labor  comes  from  individually
three  possible  explanations  that  reconcile  the  abundant  remunerative  but  socially  wasteful  or  counterproductive
evidence  about  wage  gains from  schooling  for individuals  activities  - a bloated  bureaucracy,  for example,  or
with  the  lack of schooling  impact  on aggregate  growth:  overmanned  state  enterprises  in countries  where  the
*  That  schooling  creates  no human  capital.  Schooling  government  is the employer  of last  resort  - so that
may not  actually  raise  cognitive  skills or  productivity  but  while  individuals'  wages  go up with  education,  output
schooling  may  nevertheless  raise the  private  wage  stagnates,  or even  falls.
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The claim that expanding education is good for economic growth seems intuitively obvious,
receives apparent empirical support from both individual  and aggregate data, and has become a
fundamental tenet of development strategy.  However, like many beliefs the empirical basis for this claim
is substantially weaker than is often supposed.  Two recently created data sets on the education attainment
of the labor force show that the growth of educational capital per worker has had no (or even perhaps a
mildly negative) impact on the rate of growth of output per worker.  Put another way, the growth of
education has a strong negative association with conventionally constructed growth-accounting measures of
TFP.
The first section demonstrates the strength of this surprising and striking finding in several ways.
First, the result is robust to choice of sample and estimation technique.  Second, while acknowledging the
potential weaknesses of the data, I show the results are not caused by pure measurement error of
educational attainment.  Third, in order to build credibility for the fact that schooling has not always paid
off in economic growth, I show the intuition behind this result with regional and country examples.
Finally, many believe the previous cross country growth regressions have established the importance of
human capital accumulation.  However, I show that previous empirical work which relies on enrollment
rates as a proxy for human capital growth, while not invalid statistically,  is irrelevant to the discussion of
human capital because in the available data both primary or secondary enrollment rates are negatively
correlated with the rate of human capital growth.
t  Without  implicating  any I would  like  to thank  mnany.  I amn  very grateful  for discussions  with  and conmnents  from
Harold  Aldernan.  Jere Behrman,  Deon  Filmner,  Mark  Gersowitz,  Paul  Glewwe,  Peter Lanjouw,  David  Lindauer,  Mead
Over, Harry Patrinos,  Martin  Ravallion,  Dani Rodrik.  and Michael  Walton and the participants  at the Johns Hopkins
development  seminar.2
How does  one interpret  the lack  of an association  between  growth  and expanded  education? There
is abundant  and overwhelming  evidence  at the individual  level from simple  cross-tabulations  as well as
Mincerian  type  regressions  that more  educated  individuals  tend  to have higher  wages  and incomes. It
would  seem  to naturally  follow  this micro evidence  that if more individuals  were educated,  average  income
should  rise.  In fact it does not.  I discuss  three possibilities  for reconciling  the macro and with the micro
evidence. First, schooling  may not actually  raise cognitive  skills  or productivity  but schooling  may
nevertheless  raise  the private wage because  it serves  as a signal  to employers  of some positive
characteristic  like  ambition  or innate  ability. Second,  expanding  the supply  of educated  labor in the
presence  of stagnant  demand  for educated  labor  causes  the rate of return of education  to fall rapidly. The
third possibility  is that  education  does raise  productivity,  and that there is demand  for this more productive
educated  labor, but that  demand  for educated  labor  comes  from individually  remunerative  but socially
wasteful  or counter-productive  activities  so that while  individual  wages  go up with education,  aggregate
output  stagnates  or even falls.
I) Mnre  eduratinn  doeC nnt  lead  tn mnre rapid  grnwth
A)  Menagrinrg eduraftinn  and phygiral  rnpitIl
There  are two sets of recently  created  cross  national,  time series data about  the years of schooling
of the labor  force which  use different  methods  to estimate  educational  attainment. Barro and Lee (1993)
(B-L)  estimate  the educational  attainment  of the population  aged  25 and above  using  census  data where
available. They  create  a full  panel  of five  yearly  observations  over the period 1960-85  for a large number
of countries  by filling  in the missing  data using  enrollment  rates. Nehru, Swanson  and Dubey  (1994)  (N-
S-D) take  a different  approach,  using  a perpetual  inventory  method  to cumulate  enrollment  rates into
annual  estimates  of the stock  of schooling  of the labor  force  aged  population,  creating  annual  observations
for 1960-1987.3
From these measures of the years of schooling, I create a measure of educational capital.  By
analogy with the specification used in Mincer, I assume that the natural log of the wage in any period is a
linear function of the years of schooling:
ln(wv) =ln(wo) + r*N
where WN is the wage with N years of schooling, N is the number of years of schooling and r is the wage
increment to a year's schooling 2. The value of the stock of educational capital at any given time t can then
be defined as the discounted value of the wage premia due to education:
HK(t)  =  ,  '*(wM-wO)
where wo is the wage of labor with no education 3. This is just the value now of a given stock of schooling.
After substituting in the formula for the educational wage premia into this definition and taking natural
logs, the rate of growth of educational capital is approximately 4:
AJk(Q)  = Aln(exp'MA-1)
z  This  is nat the "rate  of returmw  to schooling,  which  only happens  to equal the wage increment  under very  special
conditions.  For growth  accounting  of the current  stock the wage  increment,  not the rate of return is relevant.
3 Mulligan  and Sala-i-Martin  (1995)  pursue this approach directly by calculating the human capital for the
U.S. state by state  by comparing  the aggregate  labor income versus the income of workers with no schooling.
4 There  are two  reasons  this  is only  approximate.  The discount  factor  is assumed  constant  and hence  is factored  out
of the tirm  rate  of change. However,  it does  depend  on the average  age of the labor force  (since  the discount  is only  until
time  T (retirement))  which  certainly  varies  systematcay  across  countries,  but I am assuming  that  changes  in this quantity
over  timc  are snuH. The  other,  pomially more  serious  problem  is that I dropped  out the growth  rate of the In (wo)  term
because  I didn't  know what  to do with  it.  This  seemns  wrong.4
where lower case for HK is logs and the A is the time rate of change 5. In order to empirically imnplement
this I have to choose a value for r.  I assume it is 10 percent.  This is based on a large number of empirical
estimates from micro data.  Since we use the same wage increment for every country, the growth rate of
educational capital is very robust to variations in the value of r.  I also assume r is constant across the
years of schooling, an assumption which is more problematical, but not grossly inconsistent with the data6.
While both of the sets of educational attainment data have been roundly criticized on a number of
grounds (Behrman  and Rosenzweig, 1993,1994) I will plow ahead for several reasons. First, using real.
but flawed, estimates of the growth of educational capital stock for estimation of equations in which the
growth of that stock is the conceptually appropriate variable must be better than the widely used alternative
of using flow investment rates (enrollment rates) and simply pretending they are estimates of the growth of
the stock.  Second, the degree of pure measurement error is easy to overstate relative to the signal in the
data and in any case pure measurement error can (and will) be handled econometrically.  Third, even if
years of schooling do not proxy well human capital accumulation, they do proxy the policy alternative
often considered, which is not to improve human capital (since that is not under policy control), but to
increase years of schooling.
That said, one should not be too facile about the association between the years of schooling (and
derived educational capital) measures, which is all we really have to hand, and "human capital" which is a
much broader concept.  An individual's marketable human capital can be defined to be the annualized
5 Most  previous  studies  use either  the growth  rate of the log of years of schooling  or the growth  rate of the level  of
years of schooling  as proxies  for growth  of human  capital. While  the present  specification  is arguably  ad hoc (for
instance,  this is not aggregated  up from  individual  levels),  it is not clear what  fundamental  specification  of the earnings
function  would  generate  either  of the other  two  specifications.
6  This  does  not contradict  the widely  asserted  to be a fact  that  the rate of return  to investment  in primary  education
is higher  than  that  of other  levels  of schooling  to growth  accounting. For growth  accounting  what  is needed  is the wage
increment,  which  is the amount  by which  wages  are higher  ex-post,  not the return anticipated  ex-ante. This is important
because  much  of the reason  why  calculations  (such  as those reported  by Psacharopolous  (1993))  show primary  education
having  a higher return  is not because  the increment  to wages  from a year of primary  school  is higher,  but because  the
opportunity  cost  of a year of primary  schooling  is much lower  given the assumption  that  the foregone  wage attributed
to a primary  aged unschooled  child  is very low  (Bennell,  1994).5
value of the difference between the individual's wage and the wage for the rawest of raw labor.  There are
a number of elements of human capital in addition to the kinds of general education captured by formal
schooling enrollment statistics.  There are the additions to productivity from better health and physical
strength (Fogel 1994).  There are formal and informal occupational (but not firm) specific training
programs (such as apprenticeships. There are firm specific training programs for employees 7. In addition
there are wage increments to seniority, perhaps from on the job learning not specifically associated with
training.  Finally there are rents to special acquired skills that can be called human capital 8. Moreover,
since wage regressions in the US (and elsewhere) with every conceivable individual specific observable
characteristic (age, education, sex, race, location of residence) typically only explain only about 40 percent
or less of wage differences, if "human capital" is invoked to explain wage difference there are clearly large
amounts of human capital left unmneasured.  Henceforth, to call spades, I shall refer to only educational
capital, not human capital.
In addition to the measures of educational capital I use two measures of physical capital.  These
are both created by a perpetual inventory method from investment rates and an initial assumption about the
capital stock (based on a guess of the initial capital-output ratio).  The major difference is that the capital
stock series created by King and Levine (1994) (K-L) uses the Penn World Tables, Mark 5 (Summers and
Heston, 1991) investrnent  data while Nehru and Dhareshewar (1993) (N-D)  use World Bank investmnent
data.  The two capital stock series are highly correlated and give very similar results.  In most of the
subsequent regressions,  I use K-L physical capital data in regressions with B-L human capital and N-D
physical capital data with N-S-D human capital data, but this pairing of the different physical and
7 Total  training  expenditures  by firms  in the US is estirmated  to be around  40 billion,  roughly  a tenth  of total  (1992)
expenditures  of educational  institutions  of $390,000.
8  Steve  Young,  the  quarterback  of the San  Francisco  49ers, for instance,  could  be said  to have  extraordinarily  large
human capital, although  it has very little  to do with  his formal  schooig.  After all,  I attended  the same  educational
institution  at the same time and, I would  guess, had better academic  performance,  and yet my human  capital is a
(vanishingly)  small  fraction  of his.6
educational capital stock series is just for convenience and nothing critical hangs on this association.
The dependent variable of interest will be the  growth of GDP per worker.  GDP per worker (as
opposed to GDP per work-aged population or total population) is the appropriate variable for growth
accounting 9. Although the estimates of labor force participation are, like all aggregate data, subject to
criticism, they are better than using population or workforce aged population figures for labor which
implicitly assumes what is known to be false--that labor force participation is equal across countries.
Growth rates of GDP are calculated from PWT5 data unless otherwise specified (but World Bank growth
rates give nearly identical results).
B)  Cwrnwth  accnmting  r  ngre  s,inn  with hinman capital
Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1992) suggest that the Solow aggregate production function framework
extended to include human capital is a useful way to approach long run growth:
1)  Y,sA(t)*K,  k  *Ht  ''*L, '
Assuming  constant returns to scale and normalizing by the labor force suggests estimating (where lower
case represents per worker quantities):
2) y=a(t)*kat*h  a
Now if this specification is valid, this equation could be estimated either in levels or in rates of growth.
Since estimation in levels raises numerous problems (to which I return below), I will estimate the following
9  This output variable  does raise one problem. My estimates  of human  capital are based  on estimates  of the
educaional  capital  of the labor  force  aged  population,  while  my output  is output  per estimated  labor  force  (altbough  not
corrected  for  unemploymem)  so that  systematic  differences  in the evolution  of the labor  force versus  the labor  force  aged
population  (say through  differental  female  labor  force  participation)  could affect  the results.7
cross-country equation in per annum growth rates over the entire period:'0
3)y=  d  + cck*  + OC  4i  + Ej
The results using the two schooling series for the entire sample of countries  are reported in table
1". The partial scatter plots are displayed in figures la and lb 1 2. The physical capital results look entirely
reasonable with a large and very significant effect.  The estimates, although somewhat high, correspond
reasonably well to prior, national accounts based, estimates of the capital share'3.
Very much on the other hand, the estimates of the impact of growth in educational capital on
growth of per worker GDP are consistently small and negatixe.  Using the N-S-D measures the negative
estimate is even (barely) significant. Before making too much of this strange result, let's put it through
some econometric paces.
°O  Growth  for  each  of the variables  is calculated  as the logarithmic  least  squares  growth  rates over  the entire  period
for which  the data  is available.  This  makes  the estimates  of growth  rates  much less  sensitive  to the particular  endpoins
than  simply  calculating  the beginning  period  to end period  changes. However,  this means  the tire  period over  which  I
calculate  the  growth  rate  does  not  always  correspond  exactly  to the time  period for the education  data, but since both  are
per annum  growth  rates this difference  does not matter  much.
"  Four  counries  are dropped  from  all regressions  because  of obvious  data problems. Kuwait,  because  PWT5  GDP
data  is bizarre,  Gabon,  because  labor  force  data  (larger  than  population)  is clearly  wrong,  Ireland  because  the N-S-D  data
report an average  of 16 years of schooling  (immigration  wreaks  havoc  with  their numbers),  and Norway  because  B-L
reports  an impossible  increase  of 5 years in schooling  over  a period  of 5 years.
12 The  partal scatter  plot  is the scatter  plot of the dependent  (GDP  per worker  growth  rate) and independent  (growth
rates  of the years  of education)  after projecting  out the growth  rate  of capital  per worker (and  a constant). The slope  of
the line  in the partial  scatter  plot is the multivariate  regression  coefficient.
13 Ihe higher  coefficient  on capital  in regressions  then  the share in national  accounts  may be due to general  spillovers
or externalities  to certain  types  of investment  such  as machinery  (DeLong  and Sunmmers  1991).Figure  la
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Table 1: Basic  OLS growth accounting  regression,  dependent  variable  per annum growth of GDP per worker.
Barro-Lee  Nehru-Swanson-Dubey
education  data"  education  data2)
Basic  with  initial  GDPPW  Basic  with  initial GDPPW
Physical  capital  per  .524  .526  .501  .501
worker  (12.8)  (12.8)  (9.54)  (9.49)
Educational  capital  per  -.049  -.038  -.104  -.117
worker  (1.07)  (.795)  (2.07)  (2.04)
Ln (Initial  GDPPW)  .0009  -.0008
(.625)  (.491)
Number  of countries  91  91  79  79
R-Squared  0.653  0.655  0.557  0.561
Notes: Absolute  values  of t-statistics  in parenthesis  constants  are included  but not reported.
I) Uses King-Levine  data on physical  capital  stocks.
2) Uses Nehru-Dhareshewar  data on physical  capital  stocks.
Two columns  in table I add the initial  level  of GDP per worker to the basic  regressions,  for two
reasons. First, on a theoretical  level, much  attention  has been  given  to conditional  convergence  which
implies  TFP growth  should  be higher  the lower the initial  level of income  (Barro and Sala-i-Martin,
1995)14. On a more pragmatic level, perhaps poorer countries have more rapid percentage growth of
human  capital  or the measurement  error is associated  with level of development,  either of which  could  bias
the results. However,  adding  the initial  level  of GDP per worker has no impact  on the negative  estimates
of the effect of education.
The results for both physical  and human  capital  are robust to the sample used. The negative
coefficient  on schooling  growth  persists  if: a) only  developing  countries  are used, b) the observations  from
Sub-Saharan  Africa  are excluded  or c) regional  dummies  are included. Moreover, as a test for the
robustness  of the results  to outliers,  individual  observations  identified  as influential  were deleted
14  Although conditional convergence is of theoretical interest, it is obvious that absolute divergence in per capita
incomes is obviously the prime empirical phenomena of the modem era (Pritchent 1995).Figure  lb
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sequentially,  up to 10  percent  of the sample  size' 5. The  human  capital  coefficient  remained  negative  for all
of these  trial sub-samples.
The results  are also robust  to variations  in data or estirnation  technique. Estimates  using World
Bank  constant  price GDP growth  rates instead  of the PWT5  GDP data are roughly  the same. Using
growth  of GDP per person  or per work-aged  labor force  produces  an even larger negative  estirnate  for
education. Using  either  of the two  physical  capital  stock  series in conjunction  with either human  capital
series gives similar  results. Relaxing  the assunption  of constant  returns to scale  does not alter the negative
estimate  on human  capital' 6. Using  weighted  least  squares  using  either (log of) population,  GDP per
capita, or total GDP as the weights  also gives nearly  identical  results.
As surprising  as these  results  are, they  are actually  quite  close  to what other researchers  have
found  when  they  have  examined  the education/growth  relationship  using  data on changes  in the stock  of
education. Benhabib  and Spiegel  (1994)  and Spiegel  (1994)  use a standard  growth  accounting  framework
(extended  to include  initial  per capita  income)  and find the growth  of years of schooling  enters  negatively
(although  it is statistically  insignificant)". Spiegel  (1994)  shows  the finding  of a negative  effect of
educational  growth is robust  to the choice  of sample  and to the inclusion  of a wide variety  of ancillary
variables  (i.e. dummies  for SSA and Latin  America,  size of the middle  class, political  instability,  share of
15  Observations  are  identified  as influential  based  on the  difference  in the  estimates  with  and  without  the observation
included,  that  is;
Influence, =  L  IPk  - Pk I
where  (1)  indicates  the  estinates  with  the  ij observation  dropped.
16  Others  have  tried  relaxing  the  Cobb-Douglas  assumptions  about  substitution  between  the  various  factors  but
without  much  success  (Judson,  1993).
17 The  Benhabib  and Spiegel  (1994)  and Spiegel  (1994)  papers  use a coMpletely  different  set of estimates  of humnan
capital  created  by Kyriacou  (1991),  adding  credence  that the present  results  are not an artifact  of the particular  estimates
of schooling.10
machinery investment, inward orientation).  Lau, Jamison and Louat (1991) estimated different effects of
education by level (primary versus secondary) and five regions and found that primary education had an
estimated negative effect in Africa and Middle East and North Africa, insignificant effects in South Asia
and Latin America and only positive and significant in East Asia.  Jovanovic, Lach and Lavy (1992) use
annual data on a different set of capital stocks and the N-S-D education data and find similarly negative
coefficients for their non-OECD sample's.  Using even cruder proxies than educational capital, such as
changes in adult literacy, gives similar results as Behrman (1987) and Dasgupta and Weale (1992) find that
changes in adult literacy are not significantly correlated with changes in output.
Finding that a variable is not statistically significant in a regression is typically not very interesting,
for three reasons.  First, since pure measurement error attenuates estimated coefficients (that is, creates a
bias towards zero) using a sufficiently badly measured proxy for the  true variable of interest will always
suffice to produce an estimated coefficient that is insignificantly  different from zero no matter how large
the true imnpact  of the correctly measured variable.  Second, we frequently do not have a good prior reason
for knowing what the coefficient 'ought'  to be so it is difficult to know how far any given point estimate is
from the 'expected" value.  Finally, the failure to reject may simply be low statistical power, so while a
zero effect cannot be rejected, it is possible a wide range of other plausible values are also not rejected.
The next subsections address these problems in turn.
18  One  estimate  using  stocks  that  do not find  a negative  coefficient  are those  reported  in the East Asia Miracle  study
(World  Bank, 1993a),  which  uses annual  data in a CRS constrained  production  function  and find  a coefficient  of .154.
First, the use of annual  data in this  regression  will add enormous  noise  and potential  bias given that  by far the major
determinants  of anmual  GDP  growth  rates  are cyclical,  not long  rim  growth,  effects  while  education  growth  is very  smooth
(Easterly,  et al, 1993).  Second,  the  i-statistic  on human  capital  using  2,093  observations  is just 1.5, which  again  suggests
tremendous  noise. Third, their estimate  of the physical  capital  stock estimate,  .178, is just not on, as it is completely
implausible  and at odds  with  nearly  all other  empirical  results  and with  very solid non-regression  evidence.11
C)  Me!iirem&'t  errnr
The zero result may just reflect pure measurement error of educational capital.  By "pure"
measurement error I intend to distinguish two types of measurement problems.  The first, which I call
"pure" measurement error, is that the estimates of years of schooling of the labor force are bad estimates
of the years of schooling of the labor force.  The other possibility is that the data are perfectly acceptable
measures for the years of schooling  of the labor force, but years of schooling of the labor force is a very
bad proxy for educational capital, perhaps because poor quality schooling does not raise cognitive skills.  I
address this second type of measurement error below.
There are three defenses to the accusation that the finding of a negative coefficient on educational
attainment is simply the result of pure measurement error.  The first is simply that the results are robust
across various, independently constructed measures.  I present results above using two different measures
and Spiegel (1994) reports similar negative estimates using a third. One check on the magnitude of
measurement error is the correlation amongst various measures.  The correlation in levels between the B-L
and N-S-D years of schooling estimates in 1985 is .9119. More importantly, the correlation of the growth
rates of the two educational attainment series is .67 (table 7).  If the measurement errors of the two
methods were uncorrelated (which they won't be because they both use enrollment rate data) this would
suggest that the magnitude of measurement error bias would reduce the education coefficient by about an
equivalent  amount  (e.g  about  .7).20
19  Of course  the correlation  in levels  is a rather  weak  criteria  for judging  cross national  data quality  as most of the
variation  is between  rich countries  with  a high  level  and poor countries  with  a low  level. As an illustration  I asked my
colleague  in the office  next door, Peter  Lanjouw,  a poverty  specialist  with  no emphasis  on the economics  of education
and who had not seen the data, to guess the years of schooling  in 1985  for each  country  based only  on the minimum,
naximum  and mean  of the data. His guessing  took  about 15 minutes.  The correlation  between  the levels  of years of
schooling  N-S-D  data and Pete's guesses  is .88 while  the correlation  of the B-L  data and Pete's guess/data  is .86.
20  The simple calculations  is the "true"  variable  is x* and the observations  are x* + v,2), where  v1 n) are the
measurement  error in the first(second)  observation.  The expression  for OLS  bias is:12
A second simple defense is that  pure measurement error cannot make a positive coefficient
negative.  So while pure measurement error could account for a small, or statistically insignificant
estimate, it cannot account for a negative estimate.
The third defense is the econometric solution for pure measurement error,  instrumental variables
(IV) estimates.  In this case I have one legitimate instrumen  because of the repeated measurements on the
growth of the educational capital stock.  I can use the N-S-D schooling estimates as an instrument in the
regression which uses the B-L data and vice versa 21. Table 2 presents the IV estimates.  The coefficient on
schooling becomes slightly more negative when instrumented. The IV estimates using the two measures in
identical samples are very similar, -. 12 (B-L) and -. 13 (N-S-D), and both are borderline statistically
significant. Of course, the IV estimates will only be consistent if the measurement errors are uncorrelated,
but even if the correlation were substntial  the IV estimates should move substantially  towards the true
value.=
OLS bias  =  S
Whilc  the  correlation  (rho)  of two  measures  is;
p.
21 Instrumental  variables  always  seem  a little like  magic,  but this case, in which  two potentially  bad measures  are
used to correct  for each other the magic  seems  particularly  egregious. Ile  iruuition  is that since  measurement  error
creates  a bias in OLS  because  the effect  of the real variable  and the effect  of the measurement  error are constrained  to
be the same  (because  they  canmt  be identified).  Using  another  measurement,  even  one that is itself  measured  with  error,
allows  idricaon  of the variabe  because  of the information  from  the differing  covariance  of the new measure  with  the
components  of the original  measurement  between  the 'truthW  and the neasurement  error.
2  For instance.  assume  enough  pure  measurement  error in both  vanables  to drive the coefficient  from a presumed
"te  value  of .3 to .10, and assumed  that  the correlation  of the measurement  errors (in growth  rates, not levels)  is .5.
Then  the IV  estimate  should  be about 40 percent  than  larger  OLS.13
Table 2: Growth accounting regressions, Instrunental variables estimates.
Barro-Lee data  Nehru-Swanson-Dubey data
OLS  IV  IV  OLS  IV  IV
(w/Nehru)  (w/ other  (w/Barro)  (w/other
country  country)
Growth of capital  .458  .460  .527  .455  .455  .501
per worker  (10.19)  (10.18)  (12.42)  (10.08)  (10.01)  (9.35)
Growth  -.091  -.120  -.088  -.076  -.13  -.104
educational capital  (1.61)  (1.42)  (.593)  (1.41)  (1.59)  (2.30)
Number of  70  70  77  70  70  79
countries
R-Squared  .611  --  .607  --  --
Notes: Absolute values of t-statistics in parenthesis.
Another possible instrurment  is to use the growth rate of educational capital in a similar country as
an instrument.  To implement this I sinply  maiched each couutry with another country that I felt (without
actually examining the data) was similar, usually using the geographically closest neighbor.  One can
expect the correlation of the educational capital growth rates in similar countries to be positively correlated
(and the actual correlation is .316 for the B-L data and .619 for the N-S-D data) while the pure
measurement error of country reported enrollment rates is plausibly uncorrelated across countries.  The
results from this instrument are in columns 3 and 6 of table 2.  Again, the coefficients estimated with IV
are the same or larger more negative than OLS estimates.
Taken together. the correlations of the two measures of educational capital growth and the IV
regressions suggest that there is in fact substantial pure measurement error. The signal to signal plus noise14
ratio is as low  as 70 percent2. Correcting  this measurement  error however  makes the estimates  larger in
absolute  value  which is more negative,  which  only deepens  the puzzle.
A final  point  about  measurement  error in growth  regressions. It is very easy (and fun) to
complain  about  the quality  of aggregate  data. One can easily  show a myriad  of ways in which  what is
measured  deviates  from what  one would  like to measure. But it is just as easy (and again, fun) to tell
stories  about  why physical  capital  stocks  are badly  mis-measured  and a priori  there are few reasons  to
believe  that measurement  error is not as bad for physical  as for human  capital. Yet the growth accounting
regressions  are not  just random  noise.  The estimated  physical  capital  coefficient  is strong, statistically
significant,  and not appreciably  downward  biased  at all (actually,  relative  to our non-regression  guess it is
a little  high). Therefore, if a critic  is to dismiss  these regressions  entirely  because  of the estimates  of the
impact  of educational  capital  are downward  biased  because  of measurement  error, he/she  should  have  an
explanation  as to why  the problem  is not  just a little, but wildly,  orders of magnitude,  worse for
educational  than for physical  capital.
fl)  1-mw  much shnuld years  of  rchnnling  matter9
The benefit  of taking  the extended  Solow  approach  is that  under the assumptions  of this model  we
actually  have  non-regression  based  estimates  of how  much the expansion  of physical  and educational
capital  ought  to matter. Using  non-regression  based estimates  of the contributions  of various  types of
capital  to growth  allows  a growth  accounting  decomposition  (Denison,  1967). After accounting  for the
growth  due to factor accumulation  effects  we can define  TFP as the residual.
Since  the weights  in the aggregate  Cobb-Douglas  production  function  represent  the shares of
income,  the coefficient  on educational  capital  in a growth  regression  ought  to be equal to the share of
23 If the ratio  of  Bo_s  is used  as an estimate  of the  magnitude  of measurement  error is .09/.13  = .69,
PIv
roughly  the  same  as the  correlation  between  the  B-L  and N-S-D  measures.15
educational capital in GDP.  Guessing a plausible value for this number is more complicated than finding
the capital share, since it is not published in the national accounts, but we can nevertheless make plausible
guesses.  The physical capital share is typically around .4 for developed countries and somewhat higher in
LDCs, a figure which is roughly consistent with a variety of evidence; the estimates from national
accounts24,  the estimates from regression parameters and from rough calculations that depend on rates of
return and capital output ratios25. If the share of physical capital is .4 the total wage share must be .6.  If
the total wage share is .6, how much of that total wage share is due to educational capital?
One way of making this calculation for the share of wages due to human capital is simply to use
the ratio of the minimum wage to the average wage.  Mankiw, Romer, Weil (1992) use the historical ratio
of average to minimum wages in the US to estimate that half of wages are due to human capital26. A
similar calculation based on the distribution of wages in Latin America estimates the human capital share
between 50 and 60 percente
2' From  the  OECD  national  accoumts  the average  share  of capital  across  the 12  countries  is 40.3.  The difficulty  with
estinating  capital  share in non-OECD  countries  is that "proprietor's  income"  is typically  all attributed  to capital,  which
means  in poor countries  that  all of self-employment  (including  subsistence  agriculture)  ends  up in capital  share, which
is therefore  much  higher  than believable.  Reasonable  assumptions  about  the allocation  of proprietor's  income  between
labor,  land  and  capital  can make  the  existing  naional  accounts  shares  consistent  with  a 40 percent  capital  share (Pritchett,
1995).
25 For instance  if the capital-output  ratio (K/Y)  is 2.5 and the rate of return to capital  is 16  percent then  the share of
capital  rKJY  is 40 percent.
26  This is the calculation  that  MRW  use, that  the ratio of the average  wage in the US to the minimum  wage  has
hovered  around  2.  Since the wage share  w*L can be decomposed  into a share due to raw  labor  w, and a share due to
human  capital,  wL - W 0 lJwL or I - wJw is the share  due to human  capital.
27 Using  data  on the distribution  of worker's earnings  (World  Bank, 1993)  we  take the ratio  of the average  wage of
wages  up to the 90th  percendle  (to exclude  the effect  of the very long  tails of the earnings  distribution)  to the wage of
those workers in either the 20th or 30th  percendle  (to proxy for the wage of a person with  no human  capital). The
estimates  of huntan  capital  share  of the wage  bill  are 62 and  47 percent  respectively.  If the top tenth  percentile  is included
(so I take  the ratio  of average  wages  to 20th  or 30th  percentile)  the esdmates  of human  capital  share  are even  higher,  74
and  63 percent  respectively.  While  these  are considerably  higher  than  other estimates,  these  are estimates  of all human
capital,  not  just educational  capital.16
The other way to make this calculation is to assume a wage increment to education (taking the
micro evidence discussed below at face value) and calculate the fraction of the labor force in each
educational attainment category to derive the educational capital share.  Table 3 shows the results of two
calculations.  The top half shows the fraction of the labor force in various educational attaintrnent
categories in various regions.  If one assumes a wage premia for each of these categories then one can
calculate the share of the wage bill due to educational attainment.
K
S  (W, - wo) ai
Educational  capital share  =  "°
wL
where i represents each educational class and a, are the shares of the labor force in each educational
attainment category.  Row A of table 3 shows the share of the wage bill that is educational capital in
various regions if it is assumed that the wage increment to a year of schooling is 10 percent at all levels of
education 28. Under that assumption the educational share of the wage bill varies across regions from 26.3
percent (in SSA) to 62.1 percent in OECD and is 36.4 percent for the developing countries as an
aggregate.  Row B shows the share of the wage bill due to educational attainment if it is assumed that
primary has a higher impact than secondary and secondary than tertiary.  Under this assumption, the share
is 49 percent for all developing countries and varies from 38 percent (in SSA) to 73 percent (in the
OECD).
28 In the Psacharopoulos  (1993)  report the developing  country  average  was 11.7 percent.17
Table 3: Share of human  capital in wage bill
Wage premia by  Share of work force by educational  attainment, 1985
educational  attainment  Developing  Sub-Saharan Latin American  South Asia  OECD
under assumption:  Countries  Africa  and Caribbean
A  |B  I___  Acn_
No Schooling  1.00  1.00  49.7%  48.1%  22.4%  69.0%  3.3%
Some Primary  1.40  1.56  21.3%  33.2%  43.4%  8.9%  19.4%
Primary Complete  1.97  2.44  10.1%  8.5%  13.2%  4.8%  18.3%
Some Secondary  2.77  3.42  8.7%  7.7%  8.4%  8.8%  20.7%
Secondary  3.90  4.81  5.9%  1.6%  5.5%  5.3%  20.1%
Some Tertiary  5.47  6.06  1.4%  0.2%  2.5%  0.9%  7.7%
Tertiary  7.69  7.63  3.0%  0.8%  4.6%  2.3%  10.5%
Average years of schooling
1 7  3.561  2.671  4.471  2.81  8.88
Calculated share of return to human capital in total wage bill under assumptions:
A) Assuming  that the Mincerian return is 10%  36%  26%  43%1  30%  62%
B) Assuming  the Mincerian  return is; primary  49%  38%  56%  42%  73%
16%, secondary 12% and tertiary 8 %.
Sources: Data on educational  attainment  by region from Barro and Lee (1993).
These are obviously  very rough calculations  and do not create tight bounds but do suggest the
outer limits for reasonable estimates".  Both methods suggest  that the human capital share of the wage bill
should  be between .35 and .7 and hence, hence if the wage bill is .6  the share of human capital in GDP
should be between .21 and .42.  One way to interpret these shares is that the share of educational  capital,
and hence the coefficient in the above growth accounting regression really ought to be around .3.
Another  way to use non-regression  growth accounting is to use the shares of human and physical
capital from national accounts  rather than estimated from regressions.  I define the growth rate of TFP to
be:
29 One  noticeable  feature  is that  the human  capital  share  does  appear  to be higher  in the wealthier  countries  which
is inconsisteiu  with  the imposition  on the regressions. Three points.  First, this increase in the human capital/ output ratio
is also  found  by Judson  (1993). Second,  in this  case  the result  is an artifact  of assuming  equal  wage  increments  across
coumries.  Third.  die  constancy  of factor  shares  is a condition  that  has  been  imposed  in nearly  all Solow  type  regressions.18
TFlPD  y  - ac*k  - a,*h
where 9  is growth of output per worker and the shares of physical and human capital are imputed from
non-regression data3.
Table 4 shows the results of regressing TFP growth on the growth of physical  and human capital.
If the assumed shares are .4 (physical)  and .3 (educational)  then the growth of educational capital shows a
large and very significant  negative effect on TFP growth 3'.  Even if I assume that the physical capital share
is on the high side at .5 and that the share of human capital in the wage bill is on the low side, at a third, so
that the educational  capital share imposed is about as low as can be reasonable (.166), it is still the case
that educational  capital accumulation  is strongly negatively  related to TFP growth (column 2 of table 4).
Table 4: TFP growth and physical  and human capital.
Assumed  aK and aH (shares of physical
and human capital)
aK=.4,  aH =.3  aK  =.5.  aH-.1 6 7
Growth of physical  .126  .026
capital  (3.08)  (.651)
Growth of Schooling  -.338  -.205
capital  (6.91)  (4.19)
ln(Initial  GDP per  .0009  .0009
worker)  (.625)  (.625
R Squared  .419  .205
N  91  91
Notes: absolute  value of t-statistics  in parenthesis. Physical  capital
is King-Levine  and educational  capital is Barro-Lee.
30 By  saying  I define  it in this  was I am adrnitting  to ignoring  several  whole  large  and  important  literatures  on what
producuvity  really  is, how  aggregate  TFP  can be rigorously  derived  from  micro  production  functions,  and  how  it can be
consistently  estimated. I am simply,  for purposes  of discussion,  associating  the concept  TFP with  the extended  Solow
growth  accounting  residuals  by fiat.
31 Although  the result  is only  presented  for  one physical  (King-Levine)  and schooling  (Barro)  growth  measure  the
result  is robust  to alteratives.19
I am aware that the above TFP result is an arithmetic trick.  I could have simply done the t-test
using the regression results in table I that the human capital coefficient is equal to the assumed values of
aH  32. But the TFP arithmetic is an effective way of making the point that failing to reject the hypothesis
that educational capital increases growth is interesting because it addresses two of the issues raised above,
prior beliefs on the coefficient and low power.
First, we know from non-regression based estimates what the educational capital coefficient ought
to be, and it is not zero.  If we make seemingly reasonable assumptions about schooling returns based on
available microeconomic evidence we know that educational capital accounts for a large share of output.
Hence its growth accounting share ought to be far from zero. But  it is not 33.
Second, the TFP formulation makes it clear that the failure to reject a zero impact of educational
growth is not due to low statistical power.  Many times a failure to reject that a coefficient is zero simply
reflects very imprecise estimates.  But not here. The results in table I are a high powered failure to reject.
While the data fail to reject that the educational capital coefficient is zero, the data provide enough
precision to reject the hypothesis the educational  capital estimate is not in a large range of values.  This
rejection range includes all of the values that  non-regression estirnates suggest.  Matter of fact, the
estimates and their standard errors reject pretty much all plausible values for the human capital share (as
the N-S-D data reject zero from below and the B-L data can reject any share above .06).
F:) Can thi.g  really he right?
Since I am arguing for what many find an implausible proposition, that increased education did not
pay off in economic growth, I want to go beyond what regression coefricients say and show its intuitive
32  A t-test from  the specification  in table I (B-L  data) that  includes  initial  income  that the estimated  humnan  capital
share is equal  to .167 gives  a value  of 4.16, a convincing  rejection.
33  Weale (1994)  makes similar  calculations  about the likely  extemality impact  of education  on TFP using the
coefficients  from  enrolmnt rates. As shown  below  regressions  using  enrollment  rates are invalid,  but even  using  those
esarates Weale  found hat  the evidence  was only  consistent  with  micro  returns  to education  in the S to 8 percent  range,
which  is significantly  lower than  found  for most LDCs.20
plausibility.  The  basic credibility  of these  results  are enhanced  by the stylized  facts of four regions:  Sub-
Saharan  Africa,  East Europe,  the "good"  guys,  and the LDCs  as a whole. I give these  examples  not
because  the statistical  results  are driven  by these  countries  (as the I showed  above,  the result is robust  to
the choice  of sample)  but because  these examples  enhance  the credibility  of the regressions.
The  educational  attainment  of Africa's labor  force actually  grew at a faster percentage  rate than
any other  region, including  East Asia. This is partly because  of the initial  low base, but even its absolute
growth  in years of schooling  is nearly  as high as other regions.  Yet the statistics  on performance  in SSA
are well  known  (Easterly  and Levine, 1995). Growth  of GDP  per worker in Sub-Saharan  Africa  was half
that  of Latin  America  and only a quarter that of the more  rapidly  growing  regions. Again, this is not to say
the  empirical  result  is driven  by SSA, as excluding  it from the sample  does not change  the results. Rather
SSA,  contrary  perhaps  to intuition,  did in fact accumulate  a great deal of educational  capital  over  the  last
three decades. But that this increased  education  appears  not to have  paid off in aggregate  growth.
Table  5: Regional  comparisons  of education  and  growth  ||
Educational  growth  Growth  of output
per worker
Barro-Lee, 1960-1985  N-S-D, 1960-1987
Region:  Educational  Absolute  Educational  Absolute
Regio:  *capital  growth  increase  in  capital  growth  increase  in
years  of  years  of
schooliniz  schooling
Sub-Saharan  Africa  4.16  1.11  4.56  1.97  .753
South  Asia  3.73  1.44  2.54  1.66  1.05
Latin  America  2.46  1.77  2.74  2.44  1.58
East  Asia and Pacific 12.81  |2.57  4.00  12.83  3.66
North  Africa,  3.98  2.38  4.74  3.19  3.99
Mediterranean  I  I
OECD  1.78  2.22  .603  .973  2.4521
The second intuition building example is the comparison of the Eastern European countries (EE)
with their West and South European counterparts.  Even prior to the beginning of the recent  structural
reforms the EE had very high levels of education and yet massively lower levels of output (the large falls
in per capita income at roughly given levels of education since the reforms of course only reenforce this
point) 34. Average years of schooling were almost as high in the three EE countries for which we have
comparable data and yet output per worker was only a third as high.  Educational attainment was much
higher in EE than in the Southern European countries, yet again GDP per worker was only about half.
Table 6: Comparisons of years of schooling and GDP per worker,  some Eastern
European countries versus averages  or Western and Southern Europe
Years of  Real PPP GDP per Worker,
Schooling,  1985
1985  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Poland  8.4  7,388
Hungary  10.7  10,565
Yugoslavia  7.2  9,892
Western Europe  9.3  28,471
Southern Europe  6.7  18,772
The third example is that of the countries and regions that are often cited educational over-
performers, such as Sri Lanka, Costa Rica, Jamaica, and Kerala state in India.  For instance, years of
schooling in Sri Lanka, at 5.37 B-L (or 6.07 N-S-D) are more than a full year of schooling higher than
would have been predicted on the basis of per capita output.  The positive spin to put on these countries
performance is that they have had persistently high educational levels for their level of income.  Yet the
flip side is that these countries have had persistently very low levels of output for their level of education,
34  These  high  levels  of education  appear  to  reflect  real  levels  of achievement  in EE countries. In an internationally
comparable  test of reading  ability  of 14  year old Hungarian.  Slovens  and E. German  students  all scored  above  Denrnark
or W. Germany  (Elley  1994). In  internationally  comparable  science  exams  Hungary  had the highest  score (Posthiewaite
and Wiley 1992).22
as Sri Lanka's educational stock was higher than expected in 1965, but its per capita growth rate was well
below average, at only 1 percent.  The existence of good educational performers relative to income implies
that human capital investment does not invariably lead to high levels of output
3 5 . The Philippines was
among the top five educational over performers in both 1965 and 1985 (by both education measures) and
yet has hardly been a star growth performer.
Finally, for the LDCs as a whole the basic story line about education just does not scan.  Two
basic facts are well known.  Enrollment rates in LDCs have increased dramatically in the last 30 years.
The average gross primary and secondary enrollment rates in LDCs have increased from 66 and 14
percent respectively in 1960 to essentially 100  percent primary and over 40 percent for secondary.
Therefore, the experiment of massive expansion of education enrollnents  has been tried.  However, the
second well known fact is that, on average, growth rates of LDCs have been stagnant, or even falling,
over time and are lower than those of the developed countries.  The average growth rate of output per
worker in LDCs was 3 percent in the 1960s, 2.5 percent in the 1970s and -.48 percent in the 1980s 36. Just
when one would have expected the massive investments in education of the 1960s and 1970s to pay off,
growth collapsed.  Similarly the growth of GDP per worker was 2.4 percent in developed countries and
lower (1.9 percent) in LDCs while the growth of education was at least as large or larger  in LDCs
because of the rapid expansion of schooling. There are of course explanations of the poor growth
performance of the 1980s or of slower growth in LDCS that have nothing to do with education, but
nevertheless the basic facts about the recent historical record on education and growth do not make the
growth pay-off to education obvious.
35 This  is not  of course  to  detraa from  the  very  real social  achievements  that  apparently  stemmed  from the expansion
of education  in these  countries  and regions.
36 These  are unweighted  country  averages. Results  which  weight  by population  give very  different  results  because
of the outstanding performance of China.23
F)  What the previolis grnwth regreccions really show
There are two empirical findings from the growth literature that appear to contradict the present
results: growth regressions using enrollment rates and growth regressions in which the growth of output is
specified as a function of the level of schooling.
1) Growth and enrollment ratec
A huge literature exists showing that enrollment rates are robustly correlated with growth rates
(Barro, 1991, Levine and Renelt, 1992).  The justification for putting enrollment rates into growth
regression has typically been a more or less explicit argument that the enrollment rates are a proxy for the
flow of investment in human capital which is a proxy for the change of the stock of human capital of the
labor force (Mankiw, Romer, Weil, 1992)3'.  However, the enrollment rate is a valid proxy for the rate of
accumulation of schooling across countries only if  each country is roughly at their steady state rates of the
stock and the enrollment rates are constant over time across countries 38. This assumption is obviously false
as it ignores what is one of the most well known and striking features about development. the massive
expansion  of schooling (Schultz, 1988). This false assumption works to make initial enrollment rates a
worse than terrible proxy for the rate of growth of human capital, as the correlation between either of the
estimates of the actual growth of the stock since 1960 and the primary or secondary enrollment rates in
1960 is strong and negative (table 7).  A terrible proxy would be at least uncorrelated.
37  I argue  that  MRW  were roughly  right  about what  the humnan  capital  share 'ought"  to be, about .33 (in their paper
they  suggest  a share  of .33  for each  of physical  capital,  humnan  capital,  and labor). However,  I disagree  sharply  that  the
aggregate  data can be used to support  an estimate  of .33.
38  This waring  about levels  of investnent  and changes in stocks  holds  true for physical  capitl as well.  The
correlation  between  the investment  share and the growth  of capital  stocks  is very near zero (Pritchett,  1995).24
Table 7: Correlation of enrollment rates in 1960 and growth of human capital since 1960.
Growth of human capital  Enrollment Rates  Initial output
B-L  N-S-D  Primary  Secondary  per worker
B-L  1  .67  -.485  -.414  -.332
N-S-D  1  -.704  -.558  -.502
Primary  1  .697  .582
Secondary  1  .742
Initial output  I
per worker
Notes: All correlations are statistically significant at the 5 percent level at the available sample size.
A simple illustration of why this negative correlation exists can be seen in comparing data for
Korea and Great Britain.  Korea's secondary enrollment rate in 1960 was 27 percent while Great Britain's
was 66 percent.  But the level of schooling of Great Britain's labor force in 1960 was 7.7 years while the
level of  Korea's was 3.2 years.  Subsequently Great Britain's enrollrnent rate increased to 83 percent by
1975 and then remained relatively constant, while Korea's enrollment rate also increased from 27, to 87
percent by 1983. Given these differences in initial stocks and the large changes in enrollment rates,
Korea's years of schooling expanded from 3.2 to 7.8 by 1985 while Great Britain's expanded massively
only from 7.7 to 8.6.
If the education of the existing stock of workers is higher, then a higher enrollment rate will be
necessary just so that the cohort entering the labor force is as educated as that leaving, while when
schooling is expanding rapidly a given enrollment rate at a point in time will imply a much larger increase
in the stock as more educated cohorts replace older, less educated cohorts in the labor force 39.
39  Note that  this is not  about the fact  that  the growth  rate  of the stock  is in percentage  terms and the initial  base  is
very low.  This low  correlation  feature  of the data is because  the levels  of enrollments  change  significantly  over the
period,  meaning  Ehat  stocks  however  measured  will behave  differently  than flows  of enrollment. Even  using  the absolute
growth  in  years  of schooling  the correlation  between  enrollment  rates  and growth  is low (although  not negative)  and the
absolute  growth  of years of schooling  does not  come  significantly  into  a growth  regression.25
What does this negative correlation imply for growth regressions?  Table 8 shows the results of
adding initial levels of primary and secondary enrollment to a regression that already includes the growth
of human capital.  The estimate of the effect of human capital growth is still negative while the enrollment
rates come in positive and (typically) significant.
No one is denying that there is a positive partial correlation between enrollment rates and
economic growth.  But that partial correlation is completely irrelevant for assessing the impact of hunan
capital change.  Both the negative correlation of enrollments and changes in educational capital stocks and
the observation that even controlling for educational capital change enrollment rates are significant in a
growth regression suggest that there must be another interpretation for the partial correlation of enrollment
rates and growth other than that it proxies educational capital growth 4.  This does leave somewhat of a
puzzle as to why the enrollment rates do tend to come in significantly in a growth regression, but I suspect
this simply  reflects the exclusion of some other important variable that affects growth, like government
capacity (which would affect the supply of decent education) or income distribution (which would affect
demand for schooling) (Rodrik, 1994).
40 I just do not  see how  one can defend  using  the crude proxy  of enrolLment  rates, which  is known  theoretically  to
be systematically  incorrect,  once  stocks,  estimates  for  which  enrollment  rates  are supposedly  a proxy, are available. Since
the  two measures  are negatively  correlated,  if the changes  in stock  measures  and  enrollment  rate estimates  differ, it must
be so much  the  worse  for  enrollment  rates  interpreted  as educational  capital  proxies,  even if the enrollment  rates  provide
more 'plausible"  estimates  in growth  regressions.26
Table 8: Regressions of GDP per worker growth including growth of human capital and enrollment
rates at the same time.
Growth Physical  .501  .458  .485  .452
capital  (9.49)  (8.57)  (9.07)  (8.35)
Growth of human  -.117  -.025  -.08  -.01
capital  (2.04)  (.369)  (1.31)  (.139)
Ln(initial GDP  -.0008  -.006  -.004  -.0076
per worker)  (.491)  (2.75)  (1.53)  (2.89)
Primary  .022  .021
enrollment, 1960  (2.92)  (2.65)
Secondary  .016  .010
enrollment, 1960  (1.64)  (1.11)
N  79  77  77  76
R-Squared  .558  .626  .573  .632
Notes: Absolute values of t-statistics in parenthesis.  Physical and human capital data are from N-D and
N-S-D.
2) Gr(wth  and the level  of  wchnoling
That the level of education is significant in a growth regression is an interesting finding, but one
that is more puzzling than is generally acknowledged.  If one were going to use the level of human capital
an augmented neoclassical production function would suggest regressing  the level of output on the level of
physical and human capital.  The level-on-level  regressions results  in table 9 show,  analogous to the
growth-on-growth  regressions above, that physical capital is very strong (definitely too strong in this case)
and always significant.  In contrast the human capital estimate is much smaller and is only statistically
significant in 1985 using B-L data. There are many well known reasons why these coefficients (for both
types of capital) will be biased upwards in levels on levels regressions.  If the educational capital results
are biased upward by as much as the physical capital results appear to be (relative to growth-growth
regressions or national accounts estimates) that is, by between .1 and .2,  then the negative levels from the27
growth-growth regressions are consistent with the small positive and nearly always insignificant, effects in
the level-level regressions reported here 4".
Table 9: Regressions of level of GDP per worker on level of physical and human capital per worker,
various years.
B-L education data  N-S-D education data
Year:  1965  1975  1985  1965  1975  1985
Physical  .601  .598  .612  .619  .626  .625
capital  (15.7)  (14.6)  (14.88)  (16.55)  (15.68)  (15.28)
Educational  .085  .089  .136  .032  .064  .114
capital  (1.68)  (1.49)  (1.97)  (.658)  (.966)  (1.36)
N  89  96  96  79  79  79
R-Squared  .867  .888  .909  .885  .900  .917
Notes: Absolute values of t-statistics in parenthesis.  PWT5 data for GDP per worker and King-Levine
physical capital data used for all regressions.
A result from the "new" growth regressions, which do not rely on neoclassical production
functions is that the level of education matters for subsequent growth or that there is a threshold effect
which depends on the level of education  (Joyanovich. Lach and Lavy, 1992, Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994,
Azariadis and Drazen, 1990).  A level on growth effect is  typically rationalized in terms of spillover
effects that make the creation (or utilization) of human capital better or easier if there is more of it.  With
the present data, if the initial level of education is added to the specification the mildly negative impact of
the education accumulation persists.
While an empirical finding in cross-national data that the level of education affects growth rates
has some interest, it probably raises more puzzles than answers.  First, one would think that the spillover
effects of knowledge would be in addition to, rather than instead of the usual productivity effects.  That is,
41  If one  includes  the growth  of the level  of the years of schooling  (as opposed  to the growth  of the log of schooling
or of educaional  capital  as I define  it)  then  the coefficients  are not negative  but are small  and insignificant,  as in the level
on level regressions. It is not clear what to mnake  of this finding  as the only  rationale  ever presented  for a production
fuinotion  specification  of the type necessary  to include  the growth  of the level of schooling  in a growth  regression  is the
circular  one that  is the production  function  assumption  that is necessary  to justify  that specification.28
if  there are spillovers then shouldn't the effect of education be evident both in changes (to represent the
standard private productivity augmenting effect) and levels (to represent the externality)?  Second, if  the
entire return to education at the aggregate level is primarily spillover type effects, why the wage premia
observed at the individual level? Third, the threshold type findings at the aggregate level seem inconsistent
with the assertion from micro estimation that wage increments for individuals are falling (or at least not
rising) as a function of the level of schooling (a point acknowledged  by Azariadis and Drazen, 1990).
Fourth,  the time series properties of regressing growth rates on the level of education are wrong because
the stock of education has an obvious upward trend while GDP growth rates do not.  Growth rates are
stationary (or at least driftless) while the stock of education is non-stationary 42. This is a criticism that
applies to all endogenous growth models that make growth rates a function of any variable (such as the
magnitude of R&D or the stock of knowledge) that are non-stationary (Jones, 1995).
IT)  Why dneR  schooling  nnt mitte-r 9
So far I have I have shown that a simple, but standard and widely accepted, growth accounting
framework provides no support for the idea that the investments made in schooling accelerated the rate of
economic growth.  I have shown that this result is not the result of simple measurement error of years of
schooling and is robust to a variety of choices of specification and sample.  I have also shown that widely
accepted evidence about the importance of education in macroeconomic growth is far more problematic
and ambiguous than is often acknowledged as, it typically relies on a clearly erroneous use of enrollment
rates.  The data are definitely telling us something about education and growth, but what?
42  In the current  econometrics  jargon  education  is an 1(0)  series while  the stock  of education  is clearly  1(1),  where
l(n) is the notation  for a series that  needs  to be differenced  in times  to achieve  stationarity. It generally  does  not make
sense  to regress  an 1(0)  series  on an 1(1)  series  as it cannt be the case  that  there is a linear relationship  between  a trending
and  mn-trending  series  (unless  one  incbudes  several  1(1)  series on the rhs that  are cointegrated  , so that  some  combination
of the 1(1)  series  might  be 1(0)).  Thus  it may be the case that  a higher  level implies  a transitorily  high  rate of growth  but
no effect  on long-run  levels. Pappell  and Ben  David  (1995)  find,  using  Madison's  historical  data that  growth  rates  are
stationary  after  allowing  for one structural  break.29
I will explore three possible explanations, a) that schooling  creates no human capital, b) that the
supply of human capital has outstripped demand, and c) that human capital has been devoted to socially
unproductive activities.
A)  Doe-,  schonling  create skills9
Before examining the micro evidence for the growth benefits of education, I would like to point
out that, strictly speaking as a point of logic, the micro evidence is no evidence at all.
If the question is 'will increasing a given individual's education by one year raise or lower total
aggrtgate  economic welfare?" the individual level data are not just weak, but logically inadequate.
Individual data can show that individuals  with higher education have higher wages.  However to infer from
this  increase in wages to an increase in aggregate output requires the claim that private (or market) and
social marginal products are equal (or at least not too unequal).  But this claim about private and social
returns, which is necessary to make micro data useful for macro questions is precisely what individual data
can never show (besides being almost certainly false) 43. There are plausible models, discussed below, in
which education has all the usual effects at the micro level, but no, if not perverse,  effects in the
aggregate.  So, while micro evidence is strong for individual level questions and aggregate data is weak, if
we want to ask about aggregate social welfare (and I think we do) we are stuck with the weak aggregate
evidence, but whose interpreration  should be consistent with the micro facts.
43 It  is hard  to think  of many  mnajor  developing  country  where  one could  assert even  a rough  correspondence  between
prevailing  prices  and true  social  retunms  to  activities  over the period  in question,  in which  most  developing  countries  were
riddled with  distortions. Just thinking  of the largest  developing  countries,  is this correspondence  of actual  prices and
social  returns  true of India?  of Egypt? of Turkey?  of Brazil? of Nigeria?  of China?  of Pakistan?30
1) What the Mincerian  regresyipnn  show
If individual  level (log of) wages or earnings are regressed on years of schooling (or educational
attainment) under certain restrictive assumptions it is the case that, following Mincer (1974) the coefficient
can be interpreted as a rate of return to schooling.  Regressions estimating the Mincerian rate of return
have been carried out in a large number of countries and the results are generally quite stable within
countries and are reasonably consistent across countries'.  Table 10 shows typical results, which show
regional average private returns to schooling  of various levels.  That individuals with higher levels of
education earn higher wages is one of the best established facts in economics.
Table 10: Regional  averages  of the Mincerian  rate of retum.
Region  Avcrage  years of schooling  in the  Coefficient
sample  used
Sub-Saharan  Africa  5.9  13.4
Asia  8.4  9.6
Europe,  Middle  East, North  Africa  8.5  8.2
Latin  America  7.9  12.4
OECD  10.9  6.8
Source:  Psacharopoulos,  1993.
Note: The Mincerian  rate of return  is the simple  coefficient  on years of schooling  in a semni-log  regression  on
_earings  or wages.
This large accumulated body of microeconomic evidence is what makes the macroeconomic
evidence above even more interesting. This evidence rules out one obvious response to the finding that, on
average, increases in schooling  did not increase output per worker.  That is, the education provided was of
such low quality that it is not surprising that it had no effect on output.  This explanation seems to be ruled
44 Montenegro  (1995)  for instame  runs the Mincer  regression  (which  includes  a quadratic  in experience)  on Chilean
data  for  every  year fromn  1960  to 1993  and  finds  tbe coefficient  varies from .095 to .167. Funkhouser  (1994)  runs Mincer
regressions  for five Latin American  countries  over several  years and finds  similar  stability. The results  are similarly
stable  in  year by year Mincer  regressions  in the US, where  the dramatic  role given  to the increase  in schooling  returns
in widening  income  inequality  is because  it has apparently  increased  (at the median)  from .0635 to .0962  (Bushinsky,
1994).31
out by the fact that those with more education  earn more. If schooling  were really of very poor quality
then  why would  private employers  pay more for more educated  workers?
2)  Is. qtchlin 8 jnlra  soegn2I
9
The most plausible  explanation  of the micro data consistent  with education  having  no impact  on
productivity  and yet having  a large impact  on individual  wages is a signaling  model. Spence  (1974)  has a
model  in which  education  has no impact  on skills  or productivity,  but if workers  with high initial  (or
innate)  ability  have an easier time investing  in school  than  workers  with low initial  ability,  employers  will
nevertheless  pay more for high schooling  workers.
The empirical  difficulty  with answering  this objection  is having  measures  of innate  ability,  and
cognitive  skills  and schooling  and wages  to control  for the self selection  of the more able into  greater years
of schooling. However,  whenever  the requisite  data have been  available  there has generally  been little
support  for the signaling  model. In the U.S. a variety of samples  have been  exploited  to identify  the pure
education  effect and at least  some conclude  that there is no evidence  that  the estimated  rates of return to
schooling  are biased  by signaling. 45 One detailed  study  of workers in Kenya  and Tanzania  using  data on
ability,  schooling,  skills  and wages  shows  that, by and large, the effect of schooling  on wages  is not
because  of signaling,  but rather because  schooling  raises skills  and skills  raise wages  (Knight  and Sabot,
1991). Glewwe  (1991)  with  data on skills, ability,  and wages  also finds no evidence  of screening  using
data from Ghana. Alderman,  Behrman,  Ross  and Sabot  (1996)  find in a sample  from rural Pakistan  that
cognitive  achievement,  and not schooling  attainment  apart from achievement,  raises wages.
A second  argument  against  the importance  of screening  in explaining  private  wage effects is the
45 Ashenfelter  and  Krueger  (1994)  use  data  from  a sample  of twins  raised  apart  to control  for  innate  ability,  while
Angrist  and  Knreger  (1991)  use  variations  in the  amount  of compulsory  schooling  required.  On  the  other  hand  Behrman,
Rosenzweig,  and Taubman  (1994)  testing  different  samnples  of twins  found  their ability  controlled  estimates  to be
significantly  lower  than  the  conventional  estimates.32
amply demonstrated impact of maternal education on non-wage outcomes like child mortality and fertility
where there is no signaling involved (Hobcraft, 1993). It is hard to explain the effect of maternal
education on child mortality if schooling has no impact on knowledge or cognitive skills (Glewwe, 1995).
Even in areas where a priori one might expect the quality of schooling to be very low the health benefits of
education are present.  In data from sixteen SSA countries women with primary education have 24 percent
lower child mortality than women with no education and among women with a secondary education
mortality is 50 percent lower46.
The most plausible way to interpret the wage-schooling  regressions is that schooling expands
cognitive skills and that these increased cognitive skills account for higher wages.
1) T.c  a  negative  macro  finding  jwst failiire  to control  for  quality 9
Even though on average the effect of schooling on wages is the result of increased cognitive skills,
it is still the case that quality of schooling, in the limited sense of the increase in cognitive skills created by
an additional year of schooling, must vary enormously across countries.  Perhaps the problem is not pure
measurement error m measuring years of schooling (which, given the arguments above, it is not) but that
years of schooling do not measure accumulation of productive human capital.
First, the general expectation is that the exclusion of quality of education measures will bias the
estimate of the returns to the quantity of schooling upwards, due to what Schultz (1988) refers to as the
"general underlying positive covariance between quantity and quality of schooling."  Behnnan and Birdsall
(1983), in perhaps the most famous paper emphasizing the impact of failure to measure quality on
estimates of the returns to schooling, show that without controls for quality the wage impact of years of
schooling is seriously overestimated by a multiple of 2.
I can simulate the impact of ignoring quality on my estimates if I assume that the "true" education
4  These  figures  are complied  from  recent  Demographic  and Health  Surveys  (DHS)  which  record  child morality  ( 0 qj)
by level of maternal  education.33
coefficient  is .3 and an increase  in the wage increment  return from 5 percent to 15  percent would  induce
an increase  in growth  of years of schooling  by one standard  deviation. In this case in my estimates  are 25
percent  too high  due to lack  of quality  adjustment.  . Conversely,  in order for lack of quality  adjustments
to explain  the zero result  if the  "truth"  were .3 there would  have to be a sharply  negative  relationship
between  quality  and the expansion  of quantity. A strong negative  correlation  is hard to reconcile  with
models  of the private  demand  for schooling7.
Second,  quality  of schooling  across  countries  is impossible  to measure,  as there is no particular
reason to believe  that physical  indicators  (such  as teacher  per pupil)  or resources  expended  per student  will
adequately  proxy  quality,  and many  reasons  to believe  it will  not.  In particular. since  schooling  is typically
publicly  provided  there is no reason to believe  that dollars  spent  will  be closely  associated  with output  (that
is, one cannot  apply  the usual  theory  about  the relationships  between  inputs  and outputs  derived  from
production  theory  of profit  maximizers). There is a huge literature  on the impact  of various  physical  and
funancial  measures  of resources  expended  per student  on achievement,  with generally  ambiguous  results
(Hanushek  1986, 1995).
Third, Judson  (1993)  creates  a new human  capital  variable  in which human  capital  is valued  at its
cost of creation  across  countries  and finds  marginally  "better"  results for the growth  of the human  capital
share in that her estimate  of the human  capital  contribution  is not negative. However,  her measure  of
human  capital  which  attributes  greater value  to humnan  capital  depending  on the cost per pupil  of a years of
schooling  ignores  the serious  questions  raised  above  about  the measurement  of quality. Moreover,
attributing  an enormously  higher  value  of a year of schooling  to education  in developed  countries  simply
because  more is spent  on it seems  seriously  inconsistent  with  both the valuation  of education  using  micro
returns on education,  that  do not show significant  rises in the wage premia in countries  in which  more is
'7 There is no correlation,  positive  or negative,  between  the rates  of growth  of schooling  and one possible  measure
of the quality  of schooling,  the wage increment  to schooling  from the wage regressions  reported  by Psacharopolous
(1993).34
spent  per pupil, and with the international  comparisons  of educational  achievement. For instance,  the
reading  scores  of nine year olds in Greece  were slightly  better than  those in West Germany,  even though
expenditures  per primary pupil  were only  roughly  a sixth as high. Scores  were higher in Indonesia  than in
Venezuela,  in spite  of per pupil  primary  expenditures  at least twice  as high in the latter (Elley, 1992).
B) Is demand  for educated  labor falling  fast?
A second  explanation  is that the marginal  returns to adding  on additional  year of schooling
economy-wide  can be dramatically  different  from the average  returns estimated  from a Mincer  regression
if the demand  for educated  labor  does not expand. There are two versions  to this demand  for educated
labor story: sectoral  shifts  and exogenous  technological  change.
1) Srhnoning  hy sector
The returns to schooling  appear  to differ sharply  by economic  activity. Nearly  all of the
Mincer  regressions  ever reported  are based  on wage data, principally  because  incomes  of the self-
employed,  including  and especially  farmers, are so difficult  to estimate. While  the average  wage
increment  to schooling  for wage  earners  is typically  over 10  percent per year of schooling,  the increase  of
farmers' incomes  is very much  smaller. Jamison  and Lau (1982),  in an extensive  review  of the literature,
find that the output  of farmers  (holding  inputs  constant)  is higher  by only 2 percent  for each additional  year
schooling.
These  sectoral  differences  in returns  are important  because  in many  poor countries  wage
employment  is a very small fraction  of total employment.  An examination  of table 10 above  for instance,
shows  that the average  schooling  in the samples  used for the Mincer  regressions  in SSA  was 5.9, far above
the economy-wide  average, reflecting  the selection  of educated  workers  into  the wage labor force. Table
11  illustrates  this point  with data from Africa,  where the expansion  of education  has often  exceeded  the
expansion  of wage  employment  many  many  fold. It is easy to believe  that this dramatic  expansion  has
significantly  eroded  the wage  premia.
However,  there is little  direct aggregate  evidence  that sectoral  shifts  account  for cross country
differences  in returns  to education  or that the estimates  of wage increments  to schooling  have fallen35
dramatically as education has expanded.  Birdsall, Ross and Sabot (1995) find in cross national data that
the estimated returns to schooling are higher the higher the growth in manufactured exports.  They argue
this reflects differences in the expansion of demand for educated labor.  Of the few countries for which
long time series on rates of returns do exist, some do show a modest, but not a dramatic, decline in
estimated returns while others show a modest increase, but it must be admitted that the countries with the
available data may be atypical.
Table  I 1:  Growth  of enrollments  and  of wage  employment  in  selected  Sub-Saharan  African  countries,  from  date  of study
estimating  Mincerian  return  study  to 1990  (or most  recent).
Country  Change  in  Change  in  wage  Ratio.  expansion  of  Wage  employment  as
enrollments  employment  enrollment  to wage  percent  of total  labor
( 000)  ('000)  employment  force.
Botswana  157  122  1.3  50.4
Burkina  Faso  351  35.4  9.9  3.8
Cote  d'Ivoire  323  -7.7  9.0
Ghana  1312  80.0  16.4  3.8
Kenya  1709  436  3.9  14.1
Lesotho  142  14.9  9.5  5.4
Malawi  546  143  3.8  13.7
Senegal  180  45.4  4  5.5
Sierra  Leone  257  8.9  28.9  4.9
Tanzania  -49  9  5.6
Uganda  2254  13.2  17.1  4.7
Zambia  446  -4.3  13.1
Zimbabwe  135  111.1  1.2  36.6
Source:  Bennell.  1994.  table  5.36
2) FIh2tionn  sand  diseqgnilihrin  Fxngennim  technical  prngre.s.
A second version of the fact that returns to education may vary across countries is the view that
the major reason that education increases productivity is that it increases a workers ability to learn new
skills and respond to changes (Schultz, 1975, Nelson and Phelps, 1977).  Schultz (1975) argues that in a
technologically stagnant agricultural environment the production gains from education would be zero, as
even the least educated could reach the efficient allocation of factors and only when new technologies and
inputs are available does education pay off.
Rosenzweig and Foster (1995) add to the literature which supports this conjecture.  Using panel
data on agricultural production they fLnd  that the returns to schooling to farmers were very low where
technological progress was low, but that technological progress increased the return to schooling.  The
return to primary schooling versus no schooling, (measured as the additional net farm profit) in the
average district studied was 11 percent (446 rupees on average profits ), a low figure quite similar to the
very low values per year of schooling for agriculture mentioned above.  However, the authors emphasize
the interaction of returns to schooling with exogenous increases in district wide farm profits.  In an area
with farm profits one standard deviation higher than the average district the predicted return to primary
schooling was 32 percent.  The down side of this calculation, however, is that the estimated returns to
schooling were negative in all those districts in which growth of profits was 2/3 of a standard deviation less
than the mean profits4.  In one interpretation, schooling only paid off handsomely in those areas in which
the Green Revolution  brought technological advances that could be taken advantage of by the more
educated farmers while in technologically stable areas education was not important for output.
This explanation might suggest that the reason education appears not to have paid off in Africa, for
instance, is that there has been little exogenous change in the technical production functions appropriate to
48 Another  way  to  summarize  their  results  is that since  the education  return  is only  barely  significant  for the average
district  (t of 2.03) in districts  where  exogemus  progress  is only  slightly  below  the mean  the return is indistinguishable
from zero.37
African agriculture for more educated farmers to adopt, as the Green Revolution innovations were not
adaptable to African conditions. Other countries may have limited the flow of exogenous technical change
by barriers to foreign firms and goods.
C') Are cognitive  ckills gndiaily  prndt:cfive?
A final possibility  I will explore for the apparent negative effect of education on aggregate growth
is that social and private rates of return to education  diverge.  One possibility is that the improved
cognitive skills created by education are devoted to rent seeking and directly unproductive (DUP)
activities. These activities  can be privately remunerative but actually reduce overall growth.
North (1990) uses an interesting and powerful metaphor that suggests the problem;
To be a successful pirate one needs to know a great deal about naval warfare, the trade
routes of commercial shipping; the armament, rigging, and crew size of potential victims;
and the market for booty.
To be a successful  chemical manufacturer in early twentieth century United States
required knowledge of chemistry, potential  uses of chemicals in different intermediate and
final products, markets, and problems of large scale organization.
If the basic institutional  framework makes income redistribution (piracy) the preferred
economic opportunity , we can expect a very different development of knowledge and
skills than a productivity-increasing  (a twentieth century chemical manufacturer) economic
opportunity would entail.  The incentives  that are built into the institutional  framework
play the decisive role in shaping the kinds of skills and knowledge that pays off.
Murphy, Schliefer and Vishny (1991) present a simple model of the allocation of talent in an
economy in which, if returns to ability are the greatest in rent seeking, then entrepreneurial talent flows
into this activity.  This inhibits  economic growth by drawing the most talented people away from
productive sectors4 9. They find that in a growth regression the fraction of higher level (tertiary)  students
in engineering increases and fraction of higher level students in law decreases economic growth50.
49 Anecdotal  evideixe  of this type  of effect  abounds. There  is the possibly  apocryphal,  but nevertheless  instructive,
stoty  of one  West  African  nation  with  an employnrnt  guaramee  for  university  graduates. In a year in which  the exchange
rate was heavily  overvalued  (and  hence  there was  a large  premnia  on evading  import  controls)  60 percent  of university
graduates  in all fields  designated  the Customs  as their  preferred  government  branch  for employment.
5° One  way  to  distinguish  the usual  models  of  education  from the signaling  and distortion  hypotheses  about  micro  and
macro  returns  is that  the  usual  model  is the  "engincering"  netaphor  in which  education  is subsequently  used in innovation,
the signaling  model  can be thought  of as the "Harvard  MBA"  metaphor  of education  in which  nothing  is really  learned38
Another shred of empirical evidence for a conclusion  that misallocation of skills might account for
negative growth comes from Judson (1993) who shows the returns to education differentiated by type
(primary, secondary, and tertiary) and by initial level of income. She finds that for the poorest two
quartiles of countries primary education  had a positive effect while secondary and tertiary education had no
significant impact at all, with some point estimates negative.
When educated labor is devoted to low or unproductive activities, what may appear to be low
returns to schooling  may in fact be a low quality environment for applying cognitive skills.  Orazem and
Vodopivec (1995) find that the returns to schooling  in Slovenia for all levels of schooling increased
substantially  from 1987 to 1991. The wage premium to a university education increased by 32 percent,
from .715 to .943.  It appears in the Slovene economy that the skills acquired under a communist system
(in which increased education did not appear to pay off in the aggregate (table 6)) are paying off in the
transition.
Gelb, Knight and Sabot (1991) show that in many developing countries the public sector has often
accounted for a large share of the expansion  of wage employment (see table 12). They build a dynamic
general equilibrium model in which government  responds to political pressures from potential
unemployment  of educated  job seekers and becomes an employer of last resort of educated labor force
entrants.  They show that when employment  pressures are strong and the government is  responsive to
those pressures is strong the employment  of "surplus"  educated labor in the public sector can reduce
growth of output per worker by as much as 2 percentage points a year (from a base case growth of 2.5
percent).  Even in the case of weak pressures and weak government response, the endogenous  response of
government employment  reduces growth by .7 percentage points from the base case.
This type of government  explicit  or implicit guarantee of employment for the educated is common
and can lead to large distortions. In Egypt the government guaranteed every secondary school and higher
graduate a job and acted as employer of last resort forcing both government ministries and parastatals to
but  wages  are bigher  becae  a highly  anbinotis  group  is pre-selected  for employers,  versus  the "Harvard  Law"  metaphor
in which  wages  are higher  because  stuff  is really  learned,  but  of dubious  social  product.39
employ a fixed quota each year. The result is legendarily overmanned enterprises and bureaucracies in
which the government or public enterprises as of 1988 employed 70 percent of all university graduates and
63 percent of those with education at the intermediate level and above' 1. This obviously induced large
economy-wide  distortions  in the supply and demand for educated labor (Assaad, 1994).
5'  This preponderance  of educated  labor  in the public  sector  is probably  not atypical,  although  most  labor  force
surveys  only  calculate  emnployment  by econonic  sector,  nt  eniployer.  Gersovitz  and Paxton  (1995)  calculate  that  in Cote
d' Ivoire  in 1986-88,  50 percent  of al  workers  between  25 and  55 with  any post primary  schooling  or above  worked  in
the  public  sector.40
Table 12:  Fraction of wage employment growth accounted for by public sector growth in selected
developing countries.
Country:  Period:  Average growth (% per annum)  Percentage share of
public sector in
Public  Private  Total  increase of total wage
employment
Brazil  1973-83  1.4  0.0  0.3  92
Costa Rica  1973-83  7.6  2.8  3.5  34
Egypt  1966-76  2.5  -O.S  2.2  103
Ghana  1960-78  3.4  -S.9  -0.6
India  196080  4.2  2.1  3.2  71
Kenya  1963-81  6.4  2.0  3.7  67
Panama  1963-82  7.5  1.8  2.7  45
Peru  1970-84  6.1  -0.6  1.1  140
Sri Lanka  1971-83  8.0  0.9  3.9  87
Tanzania  1962-76  6.1  -3.8  1.6  190
Thailand  1963-83  6.3  5.5  5.7  33
Venezuela  1967-82  5.1  3.4  3.7  27
Zambia  1966-80  7.2  -6.2  0.9  418
Unweighted  5.5  0.3  2.4
mean
Source: Derived from Gelb, Knight, and Sabot, 1991, table 1.
The persistence of negative institutional  incentives  is often built into the system because by and
large the most educated control the access to power-2. Selection into the elite national civil service in
China well into the twentieth century was based on an exam that rewarded detailed knowledge of
52  Another  fun  quote  from North  (1991):
But  so too,  can  unproductive  paths  persist. The increasing  returns  characteristic  of an initial  set of institudons
that  provide  disirentives  to productive  activity  will  create  organizations  that  interest  groups  with  a stake  in the
exisdng  constraints.  They  will  shape  the polity  in their  interests. Such  institutions  provide  incentives  that  may
encourage  military  domination  of the policy  and  economy,  religious  fanaticism  or plain, simple  redistributive
orgapiation,  but  they  provide  few  rewards  from  ieases  in the stock  and  dissemination  of economically  useful
knowledge.  (p 99)41
Confucian material that many potential Chinese reformers argued had little or no relevance to creating a
modern nation state.  However, almost every official with any power in China had to have spent a large
portion of his adult  life studying for the exam, making it unlikely these same officials would find the
material irrelevant.
Similar claims can be made about the persistence of damaging policies.  The growth inhibiting
policies typical of many developing  countries, such as a large urban bias, explicit and implicit taxation of
agriculture, industrial protection, and a tendency to allocate educational expenditures regressively can
perhaps be understood as direct products of the demands of a relatively small educated elite.  More
education might lead to a reenforcement  of these policies as the newly educated protect their gains rather
than risk reform 53.
I want to emphasize I am not equating government, or the magnitude or growth of government
employment, with the magnitude of rent seeking, nor am a I saying that the expansion  of education in
government is necessarily unproductive. On the contrary, the most
recently successful of developing  countries have had strong and active governments and highly educated
civil servants (World Bank, 1994). Wade (1990) asserts that college graduates were as likely to enter
government service in Korea and Taiwan as in African economies. The question is not whether the
educated labor flows into the government so much as what the educated labor does once it is in the
government 5'.
CIonhidnn
Recently created data on the growth of years of schooling  provide no support at all for the
proposition that more rapid rates of growth of education  capital produce greater output growth.  In fact,
53 Tbis  is perhaps  the  answer  to  my  earlier  posed  puzzle  as to why  physical  capital  works  exactly  like  it should  while
education  capital  does  not. To paraphrase  the NRA,  'physical  capital  doesn't  lobby  people,  people  lobby  people.'
54 Wade  (1994)  demonstrates  the importance  of institutional  environment  for govermment  performance  with  an
intriguing  comparison  of government  irrigation  in India  and Korea.42
the estimated impact of educational  capital accumulation  on a widely accepted, growth accounting,
definition of TFP growth is large, negative, and statistically significant. I explore three possible
explanations  for this puzzling result 55.
*  Perhaps  schooling  has, on average in the sample, created no skills.  This is contradicted by
three facts that the micro literature has overwhelmingly  established: a)  that educated workers have
higher wages and that the magnitudes  of higher wages are  hard to reconcile with screening alone,
b)  that schooling, even relatively  poor schooling, does raise cognitive skills that are rewarded by
the market, c) the non-market  benefits of schooling indicate changes in cognitive skills.
* Perhaps the rate of expansion  of schooling  has greatly increased the supply of educated labor
relative to demand so that the rate of return has fallen over time.  There is likely something to this
argument, but the falls in micro returns over time recorded in the data are not large enough to
explain the very small (or negative)  coefficients observed.
* Perhaps schooling  has created cognidve skills but the typical institutional  environment was
sufficiently bad that these skills were devoted to privately remunerative but socially wasteful, or
even counter-productive, activities.
I hasten to add that none of this has the implication  that governments should invest less in
schooling, for several reasons.
First,  the evidence is clear that education (especially  if it done well) does raise cognitive skills.
The implication  of a poor aggregate  payoff from increased cognitive skills in a perverse policy
environment  is not, "don't educate if the incentive enviromnent  for cognitive skills is perverse," but rather
"reform the incentive environment  now so investments  in cognitive skills will pay off.'  The study cited
above shows that workers in Eastern Europe (Slovenia) are able to use their previously acquired skills in
the new policy environment and the return to education is increasing (Orazem and Vodopivec, 1995).
55  Most  economists  would  accept  that there  exist, in theory,  institutional  and incentive  environments  in which
investment  in schooling  can  actually  worsen  welfare.  After  all, the theory  of the second  best  suggests  that  in a distorted
environrnen  pretty  mich  anything  can  happen. What  is surprising  then is nat that  it is possihle  for education  not to pay
off,  but that  the conditions  in developing  countries  over the past three  decades  were, on average,  actualy such that
education  did not in  pr-tico  appear  to pay  off.43
Showing that education is not a sufficient  condition  for growth does not mean it may not be a necessary
condition or lessen its importance, but rather raises the importance of identifying and undertaking those
complementary reforms in the non-education  sector that will lead education to pay off.  In some sense this
paper only highlights  what is acknowledged  in the World Bank's policy paper on education, that the payoff
to education  is conditional  not absolute" 6.
Second, as indicated above, evidence suggests schooling  has a large number of direct beneficial
effects beyond raising economic output.  In particular a large amount of evidence suggests that infant
mortality falls significantly  with the education  of mothers.
Third, education had a large non-economic  component and is often privately valued for its own
sake.  Fifty percent of (non-education)  university students in Saudi Arabia in 1988 were studying
'Humanities, Religion, and Theology"  (UNESCO, 1990). That this field of study may not raise economic
output per worker is both obvious and obviously  of no concern to those so engaged (but may well have
implications for government  subsidies) 5".
Fourth,  many, if not most, societies  believe that at least basic education is a merit good so that its
provision is not, and need not be, justified on economic grounds at all.
Fifth, perhaps very little in this paper is of direct relevance to government decisions about
educational  investment.  But, in my defense, it has more relevance than most of the previous literature
which relied on micro data.  Most of this literature  justified governmenwt  investment in education using data
which showed the  pnvate  rate of return to education  was higher than the social rate of return, which is, of
course, the definition  of activities  that should have larger taxes (or have their fees raised, since the
difference in this case is due to a subsidy  to education investment), not have its subsidy increased.  Of
course, those authors that present these social and private returns do not really mean what they say and in
56 In the first  paragraph  of the Executive  Summary:  "Education  at all levels  increwes  growth,  but education  alone
wil not  generate  growth. Growth  requires  not only  investment  in  human  capital  but also in physical  capital;  both  types
of inwstmen  twnib7a  mos to  growth  in open,  cmpative economies  that are  in macroecononic  balance.' (My italics)
World  Bank,  1994b.
5  One esdmate  of the returns  to higher  education  by field  in the United  States  suggested  that  advance  training  in
theology  had  a negative  private  rate  of return  of 17 percent  (I can't now  remember  the reference,  but it did keep  me out
of divinity  school).44
particular they are usually pretty clear that they do not mean 'social" when they say 'social." 55
Presumably an economists' rationale for the government  provision or subsidization  of education is either
based on their being some positive externality to education, in which case the social return calculated
without this externality wrong.  Or is based on there being some imnpediment  to private investment in
education  (like imperfect capital markets), in which case the private rate of return calculated  without
factoring in this impediment  is similarly wrong.
As a final comment, one might ask why, even if it is true, one would want to point out education
has not paid off, especially since it is unclear how this would affect investment policies.  My answer is that
the problem of poverty in developing countries is so pressing and constitutes a human tragedy of such
immense  proportions it creates a natural and even desirable tendency to want to do "something." This
desire to do "something"  in the face of so many problems and constraints in developing countries often
lends itself to a search for a magic bullet, that one activity which can be isolated from all the other
problems and promoted irrespective of the institutional, political or policy climate.  But I think the
experience with education shows there are no magic bullets. Both history and recent experience have
shown that development  is intrinsically  a difficult business and all facets of development, economic, social,
political, are interrelated in complex ways.  That acknowledgment  makes life tricky, as progress must be
made on many fronts simultaneously. Even as desirable a goal as expanding education may be, it simply
cannot go it alone.
3' There  is an additional  problem  that  the rate  of return to an activity  by the government  is not the return to the
activity  when  the government  does  it.  The return  to the government  action  is the difference  between  the outcome  when
the government  does  what it does and what  would  have  happened  in the absence  of government  action.  In nearly  all
cases,  including  of course  the  provision  of educatio one  cannot  assume  that  in the absence  of government  action  nothing
would  have  been  done.45
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